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JURISDICTION OF EMPLOYEE SUITS

JURISDICTION OF EMPLOYEE SUITS UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT*
George W. Crockett, Jr. t

T

HE ~tatutory authority for employee suits under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 is found in section r6(b).1 Suits under this
section have been instituted in both state and federal courts. In practically every case the defendant has, by a motion to dismiss, challenged
the jurisdiction of the court. The usual ground for the challenge in the
state courts is that such suits seek to recover penalties incurred under a
statute of the United States, and are, therefore, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the district courts 2 of the United States.3 The jurisdiction of the federal district courts is generally challenged because of
a lack of diversity of citizenship between the parties or because the
plaintiff seeks recovery of a sum less than $3,000.
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS

Jurisdiction of the federal district courts seems so clear that the
frequency with which the question has been raised is surprising. Such
courts have jurisdiction of all suits arising under a law of the United

*
t

Statements of opinion expressed herein are those of the writer only, and not
necessarily those of the Department of Labor.
A.B., Morehouse College; LL.B., Michigan. Associate Attorney, United States
Department of Labor.-Ed.
1
52 Stat. L. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 216 (b): "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable
to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages,
or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in
any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf
of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or
employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and 1n
behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition
to any "judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's
fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."
2
The Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41 (9), confers jurisdiction upon
the district courts of all suits for the recovery of penalties incurred under federal
statutes. The jurisdiction thus conferred was exclusive of the federal circuit courts.
Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 23 S. Ct. 427 (1903).
3
The Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 371 (2), provides that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall be exclusive of state courts where the
suit is one to recover a penalty or forfeiture incurred under a statute of the United
States.
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States regulating interstate commerce,4 and such jurisdiction attaches
regardless of the citizenship of the parties or the sum or value of the
matter in controversy. 5 It is evident both from congressional declaration 6 and judicial authority 7 that the Fair Labor Standards Act is a
statute regulating interstate commerce. With but one exception the
federal district courts have uniformly sustained their jurisdiction even
though there was no diversity of citizenship and the sum or value of
the matter in controversy did not exceed $3,000. 8
4
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 41 (8). Therefore it is not necessary,
to sustain the jurisdiction of federal district courts, to contend that suits under section
16 (b) of the act are suits for a penalty.
_
5
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 41 (1); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S.
38, 59 S. Ct. 648 (1939).
6
ln 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 202 (b), the
Congress has stated that the act is passed in pursuance of its power to regulate commerce
among the several states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through the
exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States, to
correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above referred to in
such industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power."
,
7 ln Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) II 1 F. (2d)
23 at 28, a unanimous court held that, "the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards
Act was a valid exercise of the power given to Congress by the commerce clause of the
federal constitution..••" For other cases upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act as a
valid exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, see Andrews
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (D. C. Ill. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 380, affd. Fleming v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 384, cert. denied,
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fleming, {U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 71; Bowie v. Claiborne,
(D. C. Puerto Rico, 1939) 2 W. H. R. 444; Quinones v. Central lgualdad, Inc.,
(D. C. Puerto Ries,, 1940) 3 W. H. R. 83; Honore v. Porto Rican Express Co.,
(D. C. Puerto Rico, April 1, 1940) unreported; United States v. Walters Lumber Co.,
(D. C. Fla. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 65; Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., (D. C.
N. C. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 82; Morgan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., (D. C. Ga. 1940)
32 F. Supp. 617; Campbell v. Superior Decalcominia Co., Inc., (D. C. Tex. 1940)
31 F. Supp. 663; Fishman v. Marcouse, {D. C. Pa. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 460; Lengel
v. Newark Newsdealers Supply Co., (D. C. N. J. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 567; United
States v. Chicago Macaroni Co., (D. C. Ill. 1939) 2 W. H. R. 520; United States v.
Feature Frocks, Inc., (D. C. Ill. 1939) 33 F. Supp. 206; and Jacobs v. Peavy-Wilson
Lumber Co., (D. C. La. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 206; Townsend v. Boston & Maine R.R.,
(D. C. Mass. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 575; Fleming v. Tidewater Optical Co., (D. C. Va.
1940) 3 W. H. R. 469, 494; United States v. Barr & Broomfield Shoe Mfg. Co.,
(D. C. N. H. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 75.
8
Fishman v. Marcouse, (D. C. Pa. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 460; Quinones v. Central
lgualdad, (D. C. P.R. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 83; Campbell v. Superior Decalcominia Co.,
Inc., (D. C. Tex. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 663; Lengel v. Newark Newsdealers Supply Co.,
(D. C. N. J. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 567; Duren v. Gilman, (D. C. Ga. March 27, 1940)
unreported; Faulkner v. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co., (D. C. Ark. Jan. 2, 1940)
unreported, and see subsequent decision in same case, (D. C. Ark. 1940) 3 2 F. Supp.
590; Shelton v. Missouri, etc. R.R., (D. C. Mo. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 367; Rogers v.
Glazer, (D. C. Mo. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 990; Townsend v. Cincinnati Union Terminal,
(D. C. Ohio, 1940) 3 W. H. R. 339. Jurisdiction was assumed in Pickett v. Union
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In Sconce 'V. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. 9 and Robertson 'V.
Argus Hosiery Mills, lnc.,1° jurisdiction was invoked under section
41 ( 9) of the Judicial Code, which confers jurisdiction upon the district courts of "all suits and proceedings for the enforcement of penalties and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States." 11 In
each case the court held the action was not for the enforcement of penalties and therefore dismissed the complaint because the amount in
controversy was less than $3,000. The question of jurisdiction under
section 41 ( 8) 12 was not considered. Motions for rehearing were filed
in both cases urging that there was federal jurisdiction because the Fair
Labor Standards Act is a statute regulating interstate commerce. In
the Sconce case, Judge Otis withdrew his opinion and order (February
3, 1940) and thereafter, the jurisdictional objection being withdrawn
by the defendant, he entertained the action (August 14, 1940). And
in the case of Rogers 'V. Glazer 13 Judge Otis, on April 16, 1940, held
that there is federal jurisdiction of such a suit under section 41 ( 8) of
the Judicial Code.
In the Robertson case the court held, upon rehearing, that the
action was not one arising under a law regulating commerce because
it did not arise "out of a violation of any statutory provision which
tends to regulate interstate commerce." This decision is, however, completely out of line with the other federal court decisions sustaining
jurisdiction under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 14 An appeal from
Terminal Co., (D. C. Tex. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 244; Wood v. Central Sand &
Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 40; and David v. Boylan's Private
Police, (D. C. La. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 5 55; Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
(D. C. N. C. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 82; Morgan v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., (D. C.
Ga. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 617; Saxton v. W. J. Adkew Co., (D. C. Ga. 1940) unreported; Lewis v. Nailling, (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 494; Andrus v. Harding,
(D. C. Tenn. I 940) 3 W. H. R. 5 I 5; Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., (D. C.
Fla. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 267.
9
(D. C. Mo. 1939) 3 W. H. R. 26.
10
(D. C. Tenn. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 19.
11
Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41 (9).
12
Supra, note 4.
13
(D. C. Mo. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 990.
14
See Fishman v. Marcouse, (D. C. Pa. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 460. The court
in the Fishman case, p. 463, held that plaintiffs, in an employee suit under section
16(b), "should be afforded the privilege of examining the defend.ant's books and
records," but that "This right to examine books and records of the opposing party
should be limited ..• to an examination of the material records pertaining solely to the
parties bringing this suit."
The Robertson case was expressly disapproved by Townsend v. Boston & Me.
R.R., (D. C. Mass. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 575.
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this decision is now pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit (No. 8657).
In three cases 15 federal district courts have sustained motions to
dismiss where the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to present a
cause of action under section I 6 (b) of the a~t. In each of these cases
the plaintiff's allegations failed to state facts showing they were within
the scope of the statute. The complaints contained allegations that the
plaintiff's employer was engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The courts held that such
allegations were insufficient to show "a cause of action arising under a
law regulating commerce," because coverage under the act applies to
the employees who are engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The allegations of the complaint must show that plaintiff is such an employee,16 and a complaint
that fails to allege coverage in this manner will be dismissed. It should
be borne in mind, however, that the decisions in these cases go only
to the question of proper pleading and do not bear on the issue of
jurisdiction; in each case plaintiff was given leave to amend.
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS

Those state courts that have maintained their jurisdiction 17 have
adopted one of three theories. Relying upon the opinion by Justice
15

Foster v. National Biscuit Co., (D. C. Wash. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 552; Gates

v. Graham Ice Cream Co., (D. C. Neb. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 854; and Bagby v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., (D. C. Ky. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 271.
16 This view is in line with the position of the Wage and Hour Division that the
question of coverage is an individual matter, depending on the nature of the employment of the particular employee. Interpretative Bulletin No. I, Wage and Hour
Division, United States Department of Labor, paragraph 3. Accord: Quinones v. Central
Igualdad, Inc., {D. C. Puerto Rico, 1940) 3 W. H. R. 83; Wood v. Central Sand
& Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 40. But see Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Construction Co., 173 Misc. 188, 18 N. Y. S. {2d) 920 (1940).
17 Moreno v. Picardy Mills, 173 Misc. 528, 17 N. Y. S. {2d) 848 (1939);
Gurtov v. Volk, 170 Misc. 322, I I N. Y. S. {2d) 604 (1939); Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531, 17 N, Y. S. (2d) 851, 174 Misc. 353, 20 N. Y. S.
(2d) 570 (1940), now pending on appeal before the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York; Niehaus v. Greenspon's & Son Pipe Corp., (Cir. Ct., St. Louis,
Mo., March 4, 1940) unreported (demurrer to jurisdiction overruled); Tapp v. PriceBass Co., {Tenn. Ch. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 171, motion to dismiss appeal denied by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, June 8, 1940; Hart v. Gregory, (N. C. 1940) IO S. E.
(2d) 644; Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., (Ala. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 562; Johnson v.
Werbner, {County Court, Bexar County, Texas, 1940) unreported; and House v.
McKeown, (Duluth, Minn., Dist. Ct., Sept. 21, 1940). In each of the following cases
.the question of jurisdiction was not raised and the court assumed that it had jurisdiction:
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Cardozo in Cox v. Lykes Bros.,18 the court in Moreno v. Picardy Mills 19
held that the additional liability imposed upon the employer under
section 16(b) was liquidated damages rather than a penalty, and therefore, that state courts as well as federal courts have jurisdiction. In
Tapp v. Price-Bass Co.,20 the court concluded that "the liability imposed as liquidated damages ... amounts to a penalty," but the Congress, by using the words "in any court of competent jurisdiction,"
meant to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts. In Emerson
v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc.,2 1 the court held that, "regardless of the
question of penalty or not, it is clear that Congress conferred on this
court jurisdiction to hear this cause." In the one adverse decision in
which an opinion was written, Anderson v. Meacham, 22 the Georgia
court held that an "action for an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages is nothing more or less than a penalty fixed and incurred under
the laws of the United States." 23 "We think," the court continued, "the
Eichorn v. Kilkenny, (Ct. Com. Pl. Passaic County, N. J., 1939) 1940 WAGE & HouR
MANUAL 354; Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Construction Co., 173 Misc. 188, 18
N. Y. S. (2d) 920 (1940); Killingbeck v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 259 App.
Div. 691, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 521 (1940); Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, 283 N. Y.
299, 28 N. E. (2d) 846, 29 N. E. (2d) 667 (1940); Lamb v. Quality Bakery Co.,
Inc., (Tenn. App. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 400. Jurisdiction was sustained without opinion
in Rushmann v. Central Ry., (Cir. Ct. St. Clair County, Mo., April 15, 1940) unreported.
18 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 236 (1924).
19 173 Misc. 528, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 848 (1939).
20 (Tenn. Ch. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 171.
21 173 Misc. 531 at 532, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 851, 174 Misc. 353, 20 N. Y. S.
(2d) 570 (1940).
22 62 Ga. App. (rn Div.) 145 at 146-147, 8 S. E. (2d) 459 (1940), certiorari
denied by the Supreme Court of Georgia, without opinion, May 21, 1940. See also
Adair v. Traco Division, (Ga. App. 2d Div. Nov. 20, 1940) 3 W. H. R. 563, 575.
Jurisdiction was also denied in Jones v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co., (Dist. Ct. Pontotoc County, Okla., April 3, 1940), and in Jernigan v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
(Cir. Ct. Escambia County, Fla., Sept. 24, 1940), but there was no written opinion
in either case, and the decisions may have been predicated upon any one of the several
grounds of demurrer.
23 No reason whatever is given by the Court for this conclusion, merely the citation of four Supreme Court decisions. Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605, 23 S.
Ct. 427 (1903), concerned the "further sum" levied upon importers who undervalue
their importation. The statute itself refers to all such sums as "duties, penalties, or
forfeitures." Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Schmidt, 241 U. S. 245, 36 S. Ct. 581
(1916); and Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 50 S. Ct. 189 (1929), concerned
seamen's claims for additional compensation under 17 Stat. L. 269 (1872), as amended,
46 U.S. C. (1934), § 596. In the first case the late Justice Holmes refers to the sum
to be recovered as "a penalty." But see Calvin v. Huntley, 178 Mass. 29, 59 N. E.
435 (1901 ), where the same judge agreed that such suits were not actions for a penalty
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employee ... having elected to bring his action for a penalty as is provided by the act, is restricted to the United States court for his
relief. . . ." The defendant's demurrer was sustained.2 4 In House v.
McKeown, 25 the views of the Georgia court were expressly rejected.
There have been, thus far, two expressions of opinion upon the
subject by the highest tribunal of a state. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has ruled in favor of state courts' jurisdiction in Hart v.
Gregory. 26 And in an extended and well-reasoned opinion by the
Supreme Court of Alabama in Forsyth v. Central Foundry Comso as to deprive state courts of jurisdiction; and see the opinion of Justice Stone in the
Collie case and also in McCrea v. United States, 294 U.S. 23, 55 S. Ct. 291 (1935),
where the Court studiously refrains from denominating such recovery a penalty. In
the Collie case, Justice Stone cites with approval Buckley v. Oceanic S. S. Co., (C. C.
A. 9th, 1925) 5 F. (2d) 545; Covert v. British Brig Wexford, (D. C. N. Y. 1880)
3 F. 577; and Cox v. Lykes Bros., 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 236 (1924), each of
which holds such recovery not a penalty from a jurisdictional standpoint, and the last
expressly sustains the jurisdiction of state courts. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318,
34 S. Ct. 596 (1914), also cited by the Georgia court as favorable to its view, really
supports an opposite view. Suit was brought under U. S. Rev. Stat. (1878), §§ 19791981, to recover for deprivation of the right to vote. The question was whether
the statute of limitations applicable to penal actions should be applied. The Court,
in holding that the action was not one for a penalty, said, 233 U.S. at 325: "It is very
clear that the public wrong is punished by the fines and punishment prescribed, that
the private injuries inflicted are to be redressed by civil suit, and the amount of
recovery is determined by the extent of the injury received and the elements constituting it!'
24 This decision would seem to indicate that the employee may elect to sue for
his unpaid compensation only and relinquish his right to "liquidated damages," in
which case the state court would be a proper forum. Compare the opinion in Forsyth
v. Central Foundry Co., (Ala. I 940) 3 W. H. R. 562, stating: "If the [state] court
has jurisdiction of one item sued for, the state court has power to proceed." The opposite question arose in the case of Abroe v. Lindsay Bros. Co., (Mun. Ct. Minneapolis, Minn., Nov. 26, 1940), where the employer had made voluntary restitution to
the plaintiff and the plaintiff sought to recover an equal amount as liquidated damages.
The court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff. In Thomassin v. Max Kapp, (Mun.
Ct., City and County o_f Los Angeles, Cal., Nov. 29, 1939), unreported, the court,
while rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of his unpaid compensation under the act, refused to allow recovery of an equal additional amount as
liquidated damages. In Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co., (D. C. Tex. 1940)
33 F. Supp. 90, the court refers to the liquidated damages provision of the act as a
"penalty," and concludes that the awarding of the same to the successful plaintiff is
mandatory. See also Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 174 Misc. 353, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (1940).

25

Memorandum opinion of Duluth, Minn., District Court, Sept. 21, 1940.

(N. C. 1940)
440-441 (1938).
26

IO

S. E. (2d) 644, quoting in support thereof 14 AM. JuR.
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pany,21 it was held that state and federal courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce private rights arising under state or
national laws, "unless excepted by express constitutional limitation
or by valid legislation to that effect"; that by denominating the additional recovery under section l 6 (b) as liquidated damages,

"Congress manifests an unmistakable purpose to exclude it from
the operation of a statute which applies to penalties and not to a
claim for liquidated damages"
and that this interpretation
"is further emphasized when it is provided that the recovery may
be had in any court of competent jurisdiction."
From the legislative history of section 16 (b) it is apparent that
the original sponsors of the bill in both Houses of the Congress intended that state courts should exercise concurrent jurisdiction with
federal courts. Section 21 of the bill as originally introduced in both
the House 28 and the Senate 29 gave to the employee a cause of action
for his unpaid compensation under the act and refers to such as "reparations." No provision is made for double recovery. Section 26 of the
same bill gave to state and territorial courts concurrent jurisdiction
with the district courts of the United States over all suits instituted
under the act. These provisions were a part of the bill as passed by the
Senate on July 31, 1937. All provisions of the bill relative to employee
suits and state court jurisdiction were eliminated from the House bill
prior to its passage on May 24, 1938. Jurisdiction of injunction proceedings under the act, as passed by the House, was confined to "the
district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the
Territories."
There seems to be no available record of the debates of the conference committee of the two Houses, but the confidential committee
print of June 12, 1938, contains section 16(b) substantially in the same
form as it now appears in the act; and in the final conference report
section 16 (b) is identical with the present section 16 (b).so This section
appears therein, together with section I 6 (a) ( the penal provision) and
the heading is changed from "Reparations" to "Penalties." However,
in the presentation of this report, the House conferees continued to
refer to the amount to be recovered under section 16 (b) as "repara27 ( Ala. I
28

940) not yet reported.
H. R. 7200, 7 5th Cong., 1st sess. ( l 93 7).
29
S. 2475, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937).
30
83 CoNG. REc. 9158, 9246 (1938).
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tions" just as it was called in the Senate version of the bill; and Representative Keller, one of the conferees, in explaining the views of the
committee regarding suits under section r6(b), stated that, "the employees can ... maintain an action in any court...." 81
It would appear to be a reasonable conclusion, based upon this legislative history, that section I 6 (b) adopts the jurisdictional provision
found in the Senate version of the bill regarding suits by employees
under the act, and that the phrase "any court of competent jurisdiction"
was intended to embrace every court upon which the Congress had
authority to confer jurisdiction. It should be noted that wherever in
the act the Congress intended to restrict jurisdiction, that has been
accomplished in no uncertain or equivocal manner. Nothing is said
regarding the jurisdiction of courts of criminal proceedings under section I 6 (a), because exclusive jurisdiction in such cases is conferred upon
the courts of the United States under section 256 of the Judicial Code. 82
Injunction proceedings under section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act can be instituted only by the administrator,88 a federal officer, and
the Congress has therefore limited jurisdiction in such cases to "the
district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the
Territories and possessions." 84 If the Congress intended to exclude state
courts from the exercise of jurisdiction under section r6(b), it is probable it would have used the same language adopted in section r7.
If the term "any court of competent jurisdiction" is not given this
broad and customary interpretation,85 then not only are state courts
without jurisdiction, but the United States courts of the territories and
possessions are likewise without jurisdiction, since jurisdiction must be
expressly conferred upon those courts.86 Furthermore, in cases arising
83 CoNG. REc 9264 (1938).
28 U. S. C. (1934), § 371. Note that under this section, when read in conjunction with section 41 ( 9), the jurisdiction of the United States district courts over
suits to recover penalties incurred under a statute of the United States, is also exclusive
of the jurisdiction of all other courts-both state and federal circuit courts-unless
the Congress has excepted such cases. See note 46, post. .
88 52 Stat. L. 1066 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 211 (a), 212 (b).
Cf. Harper v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 792:
84 52 Stat. L. 1069 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 217. Section 17 of
the act appears as section I 5 in the version of the bill passed by the House, and the
words "and possessions" are not found in the House bill.
'
85 Ex parte Justus, 3 Okla. Cr. 111, 104 P. 933; (1909); Burke v. McDonald,
2 Idaho 339, 13 P. 351 (1887); National Sash & Door Co. v. Continental Casualty
Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 342.
86 See Munoz v. Puerto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) 83
F. (2d) 262 at 266, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 689, 56 S. Ct. 955 (1936); Mookini v.
81

82
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under new legislation, the courts have indicated that in the absence of
an express restriction by the Congress, state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction,87 and in the absence of express authorization the United
States courts of the Territories and possessions are without jurisdiction.
SUMMARY

The limits of this discussion do not permit an extended examination
of the basic legal arguments and decisions supporting the jurisdiction
of state courts over employee suits under the act. The principal arguments may be summarized as follows:
(I) Prior to the passage of the act the courts had ascribed to the
words, "any court of competent jurisdiction," a definite meaning. 88
The Congress, by using the same phraseology in a later statute, will
be presumed to have adopted this meaning. 89
(2) State courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts in suits arising under statutes regulating interstate commerce. This has been true of actions arising under the Interstate Commerce Act and amendments thereto,4° actions arising under the Federal
United States, (C. C. A. 9th:, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 126, reversed on other grounds
303 U.S. 201, 58 S. Ct. 543 (1938). See also, § 17 of the act, 52 Stat. L. 1069
(1938), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 217.
87 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. (Second Employers' Liability Cases),
223 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169 (19n); Grubb v. Ohio Public Utilities Comm., 281 U.S.
470, 50 S. Ct. 374 (1929).
88 In Burke v. McDonald, 2 Idaho 339, 13 P. 351 at 361 (1887), the Supreme
Court for the Territory of Idaho held that "a court of competent jurisdiction" as used
in U. S. Rev. Stat. (1878), § 2326, providing that it shall be the duty of the adverse
claimant of a mineral patent, within 30 days after filing his claim, to commence proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the question of the right
of possession means "a court of general jurisdiction, whether federal, state or territorial."
See also 420 Mining Co. v. Bullion Mining Co., 9 Nev. 240 ( l 874); National Sash
& Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 342;
Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 851, 174
Misc. 353, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (1940).
39 Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592
(1937).
40 24 Stat. L. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. (1934), § I et seq.; State of Missouri
ex rel. St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico R. R. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 S. Ct.
47 (1924); Grubb v. Ohio Public Utilities Comm., 281 U. S. 470, 50 S. Ct. 374
(1929). Jurisdiction in similar cases was assumed by the state courts in Pittsburgh,
C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Mitchell, 175 Ind. 196, 91 N. E. 735, 93 N. E. 996 (1910),
and Central of Georgia Ry. v. Sims, 169 Ala. 295, 53 So. 826 (1910). See also
15 C. J. II57, note 13 (1918).
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Employers' Liability Act,41 and actions arising under the Federal
Safety Appliance Act. 42
(3) The Congress did not intend that suits under section 16(b) of
the act should be considered suits to recover a penalty.
(a) An action under I 6 (b) is not a suit for a penalty within
the meaning of the phrase "penalty and forfeiture" as defined
by the Supreme Court.43
(b) Where the question is .one of jurisdiction, the designation
of the nature of the action as made by the Congress is to be accepted. 44
·
(c) The term "penalties" as used in sections 24 and 256 of
the Judicial Code refers to penalties in the international sense.45
(4) Even if the recovery provided for in section 16(b) be con41 35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 51 et seq. Before the amendment of April 5, 1910, Nelson v. Southern Ry., (C. C. Ga. 1909) 172 F. 478; after
the amendment, Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct.
169 (1911).
42 27 Stat. L. 531 (1893), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § l et seq. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. Superior Court, (Cal. App. 1938) 79 P. (2d) 740, and connected cases, Scarlett
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., (,Cal. 1936) 54 P. (2d) 465, 7 Cal. (2d) 181, 60
P. (2d) 462 (1936), 300 U.S. 47i, 57 S. Ct. 541 (1937).
48 In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 236 U. S. 412 at 423, 35 S. Ct. 328
(1915), the Court said: "The words 'penalty or forfeiture' •.. refer to something
imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law and do not include a liability imposed for the purpose of redressing a private injury, even though the wrongful
act be a public offense and punishable as such." See also United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 205 U. S. 105 at 120, 27 S. Ct. 450 (1907), and Life & Casualty Ins. Co.
v. McCray, 291 U. S.. 566 at 574, 54 S. Ct. 482 (1934); Sullivan v. Associated
Billposters, (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 6 F. (2d) 1000 at 1009.
44 Where Congress has intended a penalty or forfeiture it has used that designation.
First Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141 at 144, IO S. Ct. 37 (1889); Helwig v.
United States, 188 U. S. 605 at 613, 23 S. Ct. 427 (1903); see also, Foreign Contract Labor Act, 39 Stat. L. 879 (1917), 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 139, and the Federal
Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. L. 531 (1893), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § I et seq. Where
Congress has not intended a penalty or forfeiture, other designations have been used.
McCrea v. United States, (D. C. N. Y. 1932) 3 F. Supp. 184 at 187, (C. C. A. 2d,
1934) 70 F. (2d) 632, 294 U.S. 23, 55 S. Ct. 291 (1935); Cox v. Lykes Bros., 237
N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 236 (1924). But see also Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Schmidt,
241 U.S. 245, 36 S. Ct. 581 (1916).
45 Huntington v. Attrill, 146' U.S. 657 at 668, 13 S. Ct. 224 (1892), followed
by the Court in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S.
390 at 397, 27 S. Ct. 65 (1906); and Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 at 136-137
(1876). See also, Covert v. British Brig Wexford, (D. C. N. Y. 1880) 3 F. 577;
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 S. Ct. 1370 (1888), and Younts
v. Southwestern T. & T. Co., (C. C. Ark. 19n) 192 F. 200. It should be noted that
the one element characteristic of the instances of exclusive federal jurisdiction, as listed
in 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 371, is sovereignty in the international sense, and as given
to the federal government by the Constitution.
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sidered a penalty, it is evident that Congress, by using the words "any
court of competent jurisdiction," intended to make an exception to the
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts and confer jurisdiction upon
state and territorial courts as well. 46
Finally, the close proximity of, and the moderate cost in, the state
courts; the modesty of the claims that are and will be prosecuted under
section I 6 (b) ; the evident desire on the part of Congress to facilitate
the prosecution of such claims; the unusually wide applicability of the
statute; 47 the comparative poverty of the typical plaintiff and the expeditious relief usually afforded by state tribunals; 48 and the difficulty
of measuring the damage to the health, efficiency and general well-being
of the worker who has not been paid in accordance with the act,4 9 all
lead to the conclusion that the Congress intended that the courts of the
United States and all other courts within the territorial sovereignty
of the United States should be open to litigants under section 16(b),
so long as such courts have jurisdiction of the person and of the general
subject matter.~0
46 Forsyth v. Central Foundry Company, (Alabama Sup. Ct., Nov. 22, 1940) 3
W. H. R. 562; Tapp v. Price-Bass Co., (Tenn. Ch. 1940) 3 W. H. R. 171; Emerson v.
Mary Lincoln Candies, 173 Misc. 531, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 851, 174 Misc. 353, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 570 (1940). Exceptions have been made by the Congress in other
statutes. Regarding suits to recover usurious interest paid to national banks, see First
Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141, IO S. Ct. 37 (1889). See also, 2 Stat. L. 354
(1806), 489 (1808), and 3 Stat. L. 244 (1815), where jurisdiction was given to
the county courts along our northern frontier to entertain suits for fines, penalties and
forfeitures under the revenue laws of the United States.

47 Note that§§ 3(b) and 3(c) of the act, when read together with§ 17, extend
the operation of the act to "any Territory or possession of the United States." It
would be a strange conclusion to hold that employees in the territories and possessions
are covered but are not permitted to enter suit under § 16(b) in their local, federal
or territorial courts. See note 36, supra. District courts in the territories and possessions
are not "district courts of the United Stateg" within the meaning of § 24 of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41. McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174
at 179, 11 S. Ct. 949 (1891); Mookini v. United States, (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 92
F. (2d) 126; Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 808 (1904).
48 The Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, reports
that in several instances suits under § 16(b) have been instituted in justice of the
peace courts.
49 See § 2 (a) of the act.
~ 0 In Ricciardi v. Lazzera Baking Corp., (D. C. N. J., 1940) 32 F. Supp. 956,
the court held that an action under § I 6 (b) commenced in a state court may be
removed to the federal district court since both courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
a federal question is involved, and Congress has not indicated an intention to qualify
the Removal Act, 18 Stat. L. 470 (1875), as amended, 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 72.
The petition, however, must be filed within the time provided by the latter act. But
see Nelson v. Southern Ry., (C. C. Ga. 1909) 172 F. 478.

